We characterize the interplay between¯rms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between¯rms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.
Introduction
Standardization and compatibility between products belonging to the same industry are receiving a growing attention in the current literature, with and without network externalities (for the¯rst approach, see Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986 , inter alia; for the second, Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989; Chou and Shy, 1990) . Besides, there exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of product substitutability on the stability of implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices, leading to heterogeneous conclusions (Deneckere, 1983; Chang, 1991 Chang, , 1992 Rothschild, 1992; Ross, 1992; Friedman and Thisse, 1993; HÄ ackner, 1994 HÄ ackner, , 1995 Lambertini, 1997, inter alia) . Hence, a twofold question springs to mind, namely, whether supplying standardized products may facilitate implicit collusion in the market phase 1 or, whether the attempt at colluding may induce standardization. We setup a duopoly model where the cost and bene¯t of standardization are evaluated against the individual discount factor common to both rms, and we prove that the decisions concerning standardization and market behaviour are non-monotone in¯rms' intertemporal preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is laid out in section 2. Firms' interaction is analysed in section 3. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
The setup
Two independent labs operating in the intermediate product market supply a component which contributes to characterize the service o®ered by the¯nal product. The right to adopt each component costs ©. The two components are equivalent in terms of their service but not fully compatible with each other. Two a priori identical¯rms operate on the market, selling possibly di®erentiated¯nal products. Each¯rm faces the following inverse demand function (see Singh and Vives, 1984) :
in which°2 (0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability or standardization. By inverting (1), the direct demand function obtains:
Marginal production cost of the¯nal product is constant and normalized to zero.
We consider the following time structure. At the beginning of the game (t = 0),¯rms decide whether or not to share a licence, splitting its cost © evenly. If they do, they will produce a standardised¯nal product with°= 1 as a result. Otherwise, if each¯rm buys a licence separately, paying © independently, then°= 1 if the¯rms buy the component from the same lab, 2 or°= ¹°2 (0; 1] if from di®erent labs. Thenceforth,¯rms play a symmetric supergame in marketing over the horizon t = (1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 1), either in prices or in quantities. Throughout the game, the discount factor ± is common to both¯rms. In establishing the critical threshold of the discount factor stabilizing collusion under either price or quantity competition, we follow the conventional folk theorem, implying that each¯rm cooperates as long as the rival does likewise; then, if deviation is detected, say at time t, both¯rms revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium from t + 1 onwards. As a consequence, the critical threshold of the discount factor turns out to be ±
where K indicates the form of competition (B standing for Bertrand competition, and
respectively, cartel pro¯t, deviation pro¯t and one-shot Nash equilibrium pro¯t per¯rm per period, under the type of competition K. For future reference, it is useful to derive explicitly here the threshold levels of the discount factor ± ¤ K under both quantity and price competition. Straightforward calculations are needed to derive the per period per¯rm noncooperative pro¯ts (Singh and Vives, 1984) :
Obviously, the cartel pro¯t is the same in both settings, i.e., ¼
, while deviation pro¯ts in the two cases can be obtained by the reaction functions of the cheating¯rm, under the assumption that the other¯rm sticks either to the monopoly price or to the monopoly output:
As a result, the two critical thresholds of the discount factor are determined as follows:
(5) In the case of Bertrand behaviour, the functional form of ± ¤ B modi¯es as°increases above p 3 ¡ 1, since above that value the non-negativity constraint on the quantity sold by the¯rm being cheated becomes binding (see Deneckere, 1983; and Ross, 1992) . ± Unlike Deneckere, we consider the choice of°as a costly commitment. Therefore, rms face a tradeo® between the cost of di®erentiation and the increase in the stream of operative pro¯ts they may obtain through collusion in the market supergame.
The supergame
Depending upon whether the marketing stage is a Cournot supergame or a Bertrand supergame, we consider the following two subcases.
The Cournot supergame
In this case, the decision tree appears as in¯gure 1. Figure 1 : Discounted pro¯ts per¯rm.
Cournot Nash if ± < 9 17
Depending upon the¯rms' discount factor ±, the parameter space can be divided into the following three regimes:
1. ± 2 [9=17; 1): In this region,¯rms cooperate in the market stage, irrespectively of their behaviour in the product development phase, that is, for either value of°: Therefore,¯rms must choose IM over JM if and only if
2. ± 2 [± ¤ C (¹°); 9=17): In this region,¯rms cooperate in the market stage if and only if they have previously chosen independent ventures. Hence,¯rms must choose IM over JN if and only if
3. ± 2 [0; ± ¤ C (¹°)): In this region,¯rms play the one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the market stage, irrespectively of their behaviour in the product development phase, that is, for either value of°: Thus,¯rms shall choose IN over JN if and only if
These three regimes span the parameter space f(±; ¹°; ©)g: Figure 2 plots ¹°and © against ±: Overall, independent ventures tend to become more attractive as ± approaches 1. For intermediate values of ±, however, as is clear from the above, in the regime 2 the condition for independent ventures is loosened comparative to the adjacent areas. The intuition behind this result is the fact that, when their discount factor ± lies in regime 2,¯rms can sustain quantity collusion if and only if they have chosen independent ventures. Note that the boundary between independent and joint ventures is monotone over the range ± 2 [0; 9=17) and over the range ± 2 [9=17; 1): Dotted lines indicate those values of ¹°and © with which¯rms' venture decisions become non-monotone. Finally,¯gure 3 plots © against ¹°: Over the range ± 2 [0; 9=17), the boundary between independent and joint ventures shifts up as ± increases. When ± reaches 9/17, the boundary jumps down (thick curves) and thereon shifts up again as ± approaches 1. In general, rms' propensity for independent ventures increases in ± . Only in the area between the two thick curves,¯rms' decisions between independent and joint ventures become nonmonotone. In the neighbourhood of ± = 9=17, while ± is still in regime 2,¯rms need independent ventures in order to sustain quantity collusion. Then, once ± crosses slightly above the threshold value 9/17,¯rms are free from the fear of Cournot-Nash competition. Thus, now that quantity collusion is guaranteed, the incentives for independent ventures decrease and¯rms collude in both phases. This reversal in¯rms' product innovation decisions takes place only in this area, and only around ± = 9=17:
In this region,¯rms cooperate in the market stage if and only if they have previously chosen to undertake a joint venture. Hence,¯rms must choose IN over JM if and only if
3. ± 2 [0; 1=2): In this region,¯rms play the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium at the market stage, irrespectively of their behaviour in the product development phase, that is, for either value of°: Hence,¯rms shall choose IN over JN if and only if
Again, these three regimes span the parameter space f(±; ¹°; ©)g: Figure 5 plots ¹°and © against ± . In general, independent product development tends to become more attractive as ± increases. For intermediate values of ±, contrarily to the Cournot case, in the regime 2 the condition for independent ventures is tightened as compared to the adjacent areas. The intuition behind this result traces back to the fact that, when their discount factor ± lies in regime 2,¯rms can sustain price collusion if and only if they have chosen a joint venture. Note that the boundary between independent and joint ventures is monotone over the range ± 2 [0; 1=2) and over the range ± 2 [1=2; 1): Dotted lines indicate those values of ¹°and © with which¯rms' decisions between independent and joint ventures are non-monotone. Finally,¯gure 6 plots © against ¹°: Over the range ± 2 [0; 1=2), the boundary between independent and joint ventures shifts up as ± increases. When ± reaches 1/2, the boundary rotates clockwise (thick curves). Thereafter, the boundary shifts up again as ± approaches 1. In general,¯rms' propensity for independent ventures increases in ± , except in the area between the two thick curves. Over this area, while ± is in regime 3,¯rms have no hope for price collusion, whereas once ± crosses above the threshold value 1/2,¯rms can collude only after a joint venture. This makes a joint venture in product development more attractive in regime 2. Note that the area between the two curves is far larger than in the Cournot case, the reason being that the prospect of collusive pro¯ts in the future is more relevant under Bertrand competition. The above analysis can be summarized in the following Proposition. Under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, there exists a range of parameter values (¹°; ©) over which¯rms' decisions on product standardization are nonmonotone in their discount factor ± .
Concluding remarks
We have analysed the unfolding of¯rms' behaviour in a di®erentiated duopoly wherē rms must¯rst decide upon product compatibility and then play an in¯nitely repeated market game where they have the option to implicitly collude. Contrary to some of the earlier beliefs, we have established that the relationship between product compatibility (or di®erentiation) and the discount factor can indeed be non-monotone. This seemingly counterintuitive result stems from the balance between cost consideration in choosing between standardization and variety, and¯rms' concern towards future cartel stability.
